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neglect of that duty. But where, as in the instant case, the duty is almost undischargeable, justice to the insured demands a more effective remedy. Literal
compliance with the cooperation clause in the instant case would afford the insurer the opportunity of defending both the complaint and cross-complaint, in
other words absolute control of the defenses of both parties to the litigation.9
Under such circumstances it should be fairly easy for the insurer to demonstrate
contributory negligence which would relieve the insurer of liability under both
policies. To give such an unusual advantage by means of a form clause not intended to cover such a situation could hardly be conscionable. The solution of
this problem so inherently fraught with inextricable conflict of interests demands that compliance with the cooperation clause be excused.
Labor Law-National Lab or Relations Act-Employer's Speech during Working Hours as Unfair Labor Practice-[National Labor Relations Board] .- The
National Labor Relations Board had scheduled a run-off election' between an
independent and a CIO union, to be held on the respondent's premises. The
power in the plant was shut off and the employees were directed over the public
address system and by foremen to convene on company time in the shipping
room. There the president of the respondent company delivered an anti-CIO
speech to them. The respondent had prohibited union solicitation and organizational activity at any time on company premises; but during the campaign it had
enforced this rule only against the CIO.In addition, the respondent kept itself
informed as to the progress of the campaign by reports from supervisors and
through what an agent overheard at bars frequented by employees. On charges
of unfair labor practices under Section 8(I) of the National Labor Relations
Act,' held, the respondent violated the Act, (i) by promulgating the blanket nosolicitation rule, (2) by discriminating against the outside union in applying
the rule, (3) by surveillance of pre-election activities, (4) by campaign stateCo. v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 193 App. Div. 438, 184 N.Y. Supp. 243 (1920);
Brassil v. Maryland Casualty Co., 210 N.Y. 235, 1O4 N.E. 622 (1914); Vance, Insurance,
917 (2nd ed., 1930).
9In the negligence litigation the plaintiff could file his complaint by attorneys of his own
choice, and likewise the defendant could file his cross-complaint by his attorneys. But the cooperation clause would require that the defendant permit the insurer to defend the complaint
and the plaintiff permit the insurer to defend the cross-complaint. In this manner the insurer
would have complete control of the defense in the litigation.
IAn election had been held on January i9,1945, with the following result: Association, 448;
CIO, 444; neither, 34. Since no choice on the ballot received the required majority of the votes
cast it became necessary to conduct a run-off election with "neither" dropped from the
ballot and the employees left to choose between the two unions. Respondent, after having refrained from participating in the first pre-election campaign, began on February 3, 1945, an
intensive five-day campaign favoring the Association. The run-off election of February 8,1945,
resulted in a clear majority for the Association with the following tabulation: Association,
584; CIO, 394; challenged ballots, i4.It should be noted that even though 53 more employees
voted in the second election, the CIO received So votes less than in the first one.
2 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C.A. § 15 et seq. (1942).
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ments which constituted "an integral and inseparable part of the respondent's
coercive course of conduct," and (5) by making speeches on unionism to assembled employees during working hours, which constituted an independent unfair labor practice, even though "the speech itself may be privileged under the
Constitution." Matter of Clark Bros. Co., Inc.3
The National Labor Relations Act provides that it is an unfair labor practice
for an employer "to inferfere with, restrain, or coerce employees" in the exercise
of their right of self-organization guaranteed by the Act.4 The Board in its early
years interpreted these words to mean that the Act required strict neutrality on
the part of the employer in regard to all union questions arising among employees on the ground that they alone had a legitimate interest in the selection or
rejection of a bargaining agent.5 Any expression of opinion unfavorable to unionism, made by an employer to his employees, even though it was unaccompanied by threat of reprisal, was held to be a violation of Section 8(i) of the
Act.6 In its attempt to force employers to maintain a neutral position, the Board
found unfair labor practices where union organizers were described as "racketeers" or as persons interested solely in their own advancement, where unions
were depicted as "rotten" and "corrupt" and its members as "communists and
Reds and foreigners."7
While the Board's neutrality theory was attacked as denying employers
their constitutional right to freedom of speech, 8 the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals upheld the Board on the grounds that because of his employees' economic dependence, statements by an employer to them "have a force independent of persuasion."9 In its first pronouncement on employer freedom of speech
under the Act, the Supreme Court declared in i941 that the statute did not prevent an employer from expressing his views on labor policies or problems, stating, however, that such expressions were not privileged where they were part of
a coercive course of conduct.Io Two years later, in NLRB v. American Tube
3 70 N.L.R.B. No. 6o, 18 Lab. Rel. Rep. Man. x36o (1946). A petition by the Board to have
its order enforced was filed with the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit on October i6, 1946.
4 National Labor Relations Act §§ 7, 8(i), 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ x57-58
(1942).

s "The employer has no more right to intrude himself into the employee's efforts to organize
and select their representatives to represent them in collective bargaining than the employee would have to intrude himself into a stockholder's meeting to interfere with the election
of the company's directors..... " NLRB v. W. A. Jones Foundry & Machine Co., 123 F.

(C.C.A. 7th, 1941).
Matter of Citizen-News Co.,

2d 552, 555
6

21 N.L.R.B. 1112 (i94o), set aside 134 F. 2d 962 (C.C.A.
9th, z943).
7 Third Annual Report of the National Labor Relations Board (1938), at 59.
8 NLRB v. Ford Motor Co., 114 F. 2d 9o5 (C.C.A. 6th, 1940), cert. den. 312 U.S. 689 (1941),
noted in 8 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 35o (1941).
9 NLRB v. Federbush Co., Inc., i21 F. 2d 954, 957 (C.C.A. 2nd, 194).
10NLRB v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469 (i%i).
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Bending Co., the Second Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted this to mean that
a speech and letter, containing no threats of reprisal and temperate in form, although it was delivered to employees on the eve of an election and presented to
the contest as one between the union and the company, was privileged under
the First Amendment."
While it has accepted the doctrine of the Tube Bending case, 2 the Board has
nevertheless tried to limit its application. 13 Thus in Maflter of J.L. Brandeis &
Sons,14 where an employer had engaged in an all-out propaganda campaign to
defeat a union, the Board held that the Act had been violated, even though the
employer had promised the employees that no reprisals would follow. This organized campaign was distinguished from isolated utterances privileged under
the Tube Bending doctrine. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, in setting
aside the Board's order, stated that "an employer may disseminate facts within
the area of dispute, may even express his opinion on the merits of the controversy even though it involves labor organizations, may indicate a preference
for individual dealings with employees, may state his policy with reference to
labor matters, and may express hostility to a union or its representatives."" In
a similar manner, other decisions have given employers more leeway in actively
opposing self-organization among employees., 6 The Board has had difficulty in
protecting the employees' freedom of choice in the selection of bargaining agents
from gradual attrition in the absence of a clear-cut doctrine drawing the line beyond which this right could not be attenuated.
The approach of the instant case represents a new attempt by the Board to
balance the conflicting employee-right of self-organization against the employer's correlative right of free speech. The Board now considers as an unfair labor
practice an employer's act of directing his employees to listen to speeches on
unionism in the plant during working hours, without regard to whether the
contents of the speech would be privileged if delivered under other circum11NLRB v. American Tube Bending Co., 134 F. 2d 993 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1943).
2Matter of Arkansas-Missouri Power Corp., 68 N.L.R.B. 8o5, 18 Lab. Rel. Rep. Man.
1165 (1946); Matter of A. R. Benua, 67 N.L.R.B. No. 29, 17 Lab. Rel. Rep. 1229 (1946);
Matter of Oval Wood Dish Corp., 62 N.L.R.B. ii29 (1945).
"3Matter of Van Raalte, Inc., 69 N.L.R.B. 1326, I8 Lab. Rel. Rep. Man. 1312 (1946);
Matter of Semet-Solvay Co., 68 N.L.R.B. 352, 18 Lab. Rel. Rep. Man. ixi6 (x946); Matter of
Goodall Co., 68 N.L.R.B. 252, x8 Lab. Rel. Rep. Man. 1119 (1946).
X454 N.L.R.B. 88o (1944).
's NLRB v. J. L. Brandeis & Sons, 14, F. 2d 556, 564 (C.C.A. 8th, 1944). But see Peter J.
Schweitzer, Inc. v. NLRB, 144 F. 2d 520, 524 (App. D.C., 1944).
x6NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., g Lab. Rel. Rep. Man. 2o08 (C.C.A. 8th, 1946);
NLRB v. American Pearl Button Co., i49 F. 2d 311 (C.C.A. 8th, x945); Big Lake Oil Co. v.
NLRB, 146 F. 2d 967 (C.C.A. 5th, 1945); NLRB v. Brown-Brockmeyer Co., 143 F. 2d 537
(C.C.A. 6th, 1944); Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 142 F. 2d 922 (C.C.A. 3rd, x944);
see Jacksonville Paper Co. v. NLRB, 137 F. 2d X48 (C.C.A. 5th, x943).
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stances.' 7 And it took the trouble expressly to enunciate this new doctrine, even
though the respondent's other conduct furnished ample grounds otherwise to
support its findings of unfair labor practices. 8
The Board argued that while the Act guarantees to employees "full freedom
to receive aid, advice, and information from others" concerning their right of
self-organization,9 it also leaves employees free to determine whether or not to
receive such aid, advice, and information, concluding that to force employees to
do so interferes "with the selection of a representative of the employees'
choice.""2 The soundness of this argument standing alone seems questionable.
Clearly an employer may communicate to his employees by mail his opinions
regarding the selection of a bargaining agent. 21 And it is most improbable that
'7 The fact that an employer delivered a speech to employees on working time was first
singled out as an element in the question of the employer's freedom to express anti-union
views in a decision a year and a half prior to the Clark Bros. case. Matter of Thompson
Products, Inc., 60 N.L.R.B. 1381 (i945). While occasionally noted as a factor in decisions
subsequently rendered, Matter of Wennonah Cotton Mills Co., Inc., 63 N.L.R.B. 143 (I945);

Matter of Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 64 N.L.R.B. 432 (1945); Matter of Monumental

Life Insurance Co., 67 N.L.R.B. No. 35, 17 Lab. Rel. Rep. 1230 (1946), it had never been
raised to the status of an independent unfair labor practice until the instant case. The following
are other examples of activity held by the Board to constitute independent unfair labor practices: the anti-union employment contract, National Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350
(i94o); the blacklisting of union members, NLRB v. Waumbec Mills, Inc., 114 F. 2d 226
(C.C.A. ist, i94o); the questioning of employees concerning union membership, activity or
interest, NLRB v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 3oi U.S. 49 (1937). Cf. Matter of Peyton Packing Co.,
49 N.L.R.B. 828 (i943), where the promulgation of a rule prohibiting union solicitation on
company premises outside of working hours was held to create a rebuttable presumption of
unfair labor practice rather than necessarily constituting an unfair labor practice.
IsDiscriminatory application of a blanket no-solicitation rule held to be an unfair labor
practice, NLRB v. May Department Stores Co., 154 F. 2d 533 (C.C.A. 8th, 1946); see International Association of Machinists v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 72 (i94o). Promulgation of rule prohibiting union solicitation at any time on company premises held to be an unfair labor practice, Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945). Surveillance over union activities held to constitute an unfair labor practice, NLRB v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 146 F. 2d
454 (C.C.A. 4th, i944). The Supreme Court has stated that "pressure exerted vocally by the
employer," if it is part of a coercive course of conduct, "may no more be disregarded than
pressure exerted in other ways." NLRB v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469, 477
(194); NLRB v. American Laundry Machinery Co., 152 F. 2d 4oo (C.C.A. 2nd, 1945).
Matter of Harlan Fuel Co., 8 N.L.R.B. 25, 32 (1938).
2oMatter of Clark Bros. Co., Inc., 70 N.L.R.B. No. 6o, I8 Lab. Rel. Rep. Man. 136o, 1361
'9

(1946). The right is necessarily an interpolation from Section 7 of the Act which lists the
"Rights of Employees" as follows: "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to
form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities, for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." 49 Stat. 449 (935),

29 U.S.C.A. § 157 (942).

"The Wagner Act did not undertake the impossible task of specifying in precise and unmistakable language each incident which would constitute an unfair labor practice. On the
contrary, that Act left to the Board the work of applying the Act's general prohibitory language in the light of the infinite combinations of events which might be charged as violative
of its terms." Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 798 0945). Cf. Phelps Dodge
Corp. v. NRB, 313 U.S. X77 (1941).
2

NLRB v. American Tube Bending Co., 134 F. 2d 993 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1943).
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an employee would not read a special delivery letter sent to him at his home by
the president of the company, even though he arguably remained free to toss
it unread into the wastebasket.22 This speculation seems justified, even though
it be admitted that the same employee, in a practical sense, would not be as free
to walk out of a meeting being held on working time.
Now the Board stresses the infringement of the abstract right of an employee
to choose whether or not he shall listen to his employer's utterances. It is submitted that this is not the real heart of the violation of employee self-organizational rights in the type of situation under discussion. The real offense is, rather,
the subtle coercion implicit in an employee's being forced to listen to an employer's speech in the plant itself. The Board's finding of an independent violation of Section 8(1) in the employer's use of "its superior economic power in
coercing its employees to listen to speeches relating to organizational activity ' ) 23
seems to have real significance when viewed in this light.
Words uttered by an employer to a compulsory audience within the everyday working surroundings of the plant have far different import and effect than
if these very same words were read by an employee in his own home. As Judge
Learned Hand has so realistically observed: "Words are not pebbles in alien juxtaposition; they have only a communal existence; and not only does the meaning of each interpenetrate the other, but all in their aggregate take their purport
from the setting in which they are used, of which the relation between the speak'
er and the hearer is perhaps the most important part. 24
Social scientists have noted the existence of what might be called deference
patterns, which predispose people to respond automatically towards those to
whom they have been in the custom of responding.25 Thus, while they are in the
plant, employees customarily obey the instructions of company supervisors and
officials. Habitual responses of this type tend to operate whether the employee
is responding to the desires of the employer that he should perform some shop
operation or that he should pursue some less objective course-such as voting
against a certain union.26 Hence it seems not unreasonable to deny the employer
-It seems apparent, however, that any employee with such determined anti-employer
sentiments would hardly be deterred by anything an employer might say within the present
permissible area of employer free speech under the Act.
23Matter of Clark Bros. Co., Inc., 7o N.L.R.B. No. 6o, i8Lab. Rel. Rep. Man. 136o, 1361
(1946).
24 NFLRB v. Federbush Co., Inc., 121 F. 2d 954, 957 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1941). "And yet, the
voice of authority may .... provoke fear and awe quite as readily as it may bespeak fatherly
advice. The position of the employer ....carries such weight and influence that his words
may be coercive when they would not be so if the relation of master and servant did not
exist." NLRB v. Falk Corp., 102 F. 2d 383, 389 (C.C.A. 7th, 1939).
2s See Chapple & Coon, Principles of Anthropology 26-72 (r941); Roethlisberger & Dickson, Management and the Worker 358-59, 564-68 (1939); Gardner, Human Relations in
Industry 65-84, 168-70 (1945).
26This is not to suggest that all employees will react in the same manner. The studies
indicate, for example, that some employees react strongly against such tactics, but these will

RECENT CASES
the opportunity of utilizing the plant pattern of response to defeat employee
self-organization. For to justify such behavior as an appeal to the employee's
reason ignores elementary precepts in the field of industrial human relations.27
And in addition the display of power inherent in the compulsory audience is itself of considerable psychological significance. Field studies indicate how deeprooted is the feeling among workers that their future welfare depends upon "not
crossing the boss."'2 As the Supreme Court has observed, "Intimations of an
employer's preference, though subtle, may be as potent as outright threats of
discharge.' ' 2 9 It seems particularly true in cases of this sort, where two unions
are competing, that the employees would reasonably get the idea from their employer's conduct that he would be more generous in making them concessions if
the union of his choice were selected. Yet it is perfectly obvious that if the employer actually made an overt statement to that effect, he would be guilty of an
unfair labor practice.30
In the instant case the employer availed himself of an additional psychological advantage by making his final appeal only a few minutes before the polls
opened.3z This is a considerable advantage which adheres to the employer
through his control over working time. 32 Thus the employees went to the polls
be drawn largely from the union adherents. In close situations it is quite likely to affect a
sufficient number of those employees on the fence to be decisive in the election. See Whyte,
Who Goes Union and Why?, 23 Personnel Journal 215 (i944).
27See Whitehead, Leadership in a Free Society 89-90, 97-98, 111-20 (1936); Mayo,
Human Problems of an Industrial Civilization 164 (1933).
's See Gardner, Human Relations in Industry 8, 10, 98 (1945).
29 NLRB v. Link-Belt Co., 311 U.S. 584, 6oo (i941).
30 Cf. Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678 ('944); Matter of Agar Packing
& Provision Corp., 58 N.L.R.B. 738 (1944).
3zThe Board has always sought to prevent campaigning "at or near" the polling place on
election day, so as to safeguard the free choice of employees. Should the court reverse the
Board's finding that the compulsory audience constitutes an unfair labor practice, the Board
could still exercise its own judgment in determining whether such conduct interfered with the
employee's free choice and, if it so found, could set aside the election results. Matter of A. J.
Thrall, 65 N.L.R.B. No. I5, 17 Lab. Rel. Rep. 652 (i945). Such action by the Board, coming
under Section 9 of the Act, is not subject to court review, unless it later becomes part of the
record in unfair labor practice charge proceedings under Section 8(5). American Federation of
Labor v. NLRB, 3o8 U.S. 4oi (i94o); National Labor Relations Act § 9(d), 49 Stat. 449
(1935), 29 U.S.C.A. § 159 (1942).
3'In one case an employer worked his employees overtime to prevent them from attending a scheduled union meeting. Matter of Tidewater Iron & Steel Co., Inc., 9 N.L.R.B. 624
(1938). In another an employer was held to have interfered with his employees' freedom of
choice where he approached them individually at their machines to discuss an impending
union election. The Board termed this "a subtle form of coercion more potent than an employer's address to a forced audience of his employees." Matter of A. J. Thrall, 65 N.L.R.B.
No. I5, 17 Lab. Rel. Rep. 652 (1945). Employers apparently believe that they are free to subject their employees to a variety of high-pressured influences as long as they pay them to
listen. Unless the Board can establish that employees have some rights concerning the pressure
an employer may subject them to, nothing is to prevent an employer from scheduling an anti-
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under the influence of the emotional charge contained in the employer's last
minute speech, without adequate time to consider intellectually the arguments
presented and without an opportunity having been afforded the union to offer
a rebuttal. A speech delivered under these circumstances seems the antithesis
of an appeal to reason. Indeed, if appeal to reason had been the employer's object, would henot have addressed the employees some days prior to the election
or have presented his message in printed form, so that his employees could have
studied and evaluated its worth? After all, the Board's new doctrine does not
deny the employer means of communicating his ideas to his employees. Its refusing him the avenue of a compulsory audience in no way affects his ability to
communicate with his employees by mail, circulars, or at a voluntarily attended
meeting. These, indeed, are the only media of communication open to the union.
If an employer's conduct is coercive, the Supreme Court has indicated~that
no question of constitutional privilege is involved in declaring it to be an unfair
labor practice.33 The question of whether coercion is a conclusion of fact or of
law has been the subject of considerable discussion and differences of opinion
among the courts.34The problem is important in that, under the National Labor
Relations Act, findings of fact by the Board are conclusive if supported by eviunion rally on the night preceding the election, to which he can compel the attendance of his
employees. Employers who had once been unable to express even a critical opinion to their
employees on unionism would have swung around to the point where they could command
their attendance at the most strategic moments, tactically precluding by their economic
control any opportunity for union competition for the employee's time or even for rebuttal by
the union. Moreover, the actual overtime payments for attending the meeting would amount
to a subtle form of economic allurement which would attract employees even to "voluntary"
meetings.
33 See NLRB v. Virginia Electric &Power Co., 314 U.S. 469, 477 (194x); Virginia Electric
& Power Co. v. NILRB, 319 U.S. 533 (1943).
34 A basic disagreement has arisen among the circuit courts as to whether there can be
court review involving re-evaluation of the evidence, of the Board's finding that an employer's
utterances, otherwise privileged, are part of a coercive course of conduct and hence themselves
unfair labor practices. The dispute hinges on whether coercion is a question of fact or of law,
since the Supreme Court has held that findings of fact by the Board, if supported by substantial evidence, are not subject to judicial review. NLRB v. Link-Belt Co., 311 U.S. 584
(194i). "The determination of the category into which the remarks fell was a question of fact
for the Board ....and the Board's finding on the fact may not be disturbed." Elastic Stop
Nut Corp. v. NLRB, 142 F. 2d 371, 378 (C.C.A. 8th, x944). NLRB v. American Laundry
Machinery Co., 152 F. 2d 40o (C.C.A. 2nd, 1945); Peter J. Schweitzer, Inc. v. NLRB, 144 F.
2d 52o (App. D.C., i944); NLRB v. Trojan Powder Co., 135 F. 2d 337 (C.C.A. 3rd, 1943),
cert. den. 320 U.S. 768. Contra: NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., ig Lab. Rel. Rep. Man.
2008 (C.C.A. 8th, 1946); NLRB v. J. L. Brandeis & Sons, 145 F. 2d 556 (C.C.A. 8th, 1944);
NLR1B v. American Pearl Button Co., 149 F. 2d 311 (C.C.A. 8th, 1945); Big Lake Oil Co. v.
NLRB, 146 F. 2d 967 (C.C.A. 5 th, 1945). For a general discussion of this subject, see Brown,
Fact and Law in Judicial Review, 56 Harv. L. Rev. 899 (1943).
The Supreme Court has indicated that at least as to the applicability of a broad statutory
term, as "coerce" is in this case, the functions of a reviewing court are limited. NLRB v. Hearst
Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130-31 (i944). The question of the scope of review of the
Board's findings where a constitutional issue is involved, however, has not yet been determined.
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dence.35 However this matter may be legally categorized, practically it presents
a problem of determining what effect certain conduct and circumstances have
on the employees' subjective freedom of choice. And this consideration reminds
us forcefully of the judicial observation that "the state of a man's mind is as
much a fact as the state of his digestion."36 Hence it is submitted that the determination of the state of an employee's mind is a matter-if you please, of
fact-requiring professional analysis by specialists. And it is obvious that the
Board is best equipped for such an analysis.37 To determine where persuasion
leaves off and coercion begins necessitates the weighing of numerous intangible
factors. "The detection and appraisal of such imponderables are indeed one of
the essential functions of an expert administrative agency."3' Some circuit
court of appeals judges seem to deny the possibility of coercion wherever the
employer has at some point assured his employees that they were free to vote
either way without reprisal.39 In its failure to appreciate the decisive emotional
3s

Section zo(e), 49 Stat. 449 (X935),

29 U.S.C.A.

36 Bowen, L. J., in Edgington v. Fitzmaurice,

§ 16o

(1942).

Ch. Div. 459, 483 (C.A., 1885):
37 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in an opinion by Judge Learned Hand, handed
down since the landmark Tube Bending decision, properly observed that "the question of
how deeply an employer's relations with his employees will overbear their will" is the sort
of problem "to decide which a board, or tribunal chosen from those who have had long acquaintance with labor relations, may acquire a competence beyond that of any court."
NLRB v. Standard Oil Co., z38 F. 2d 885, 887 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1943). "That there can be issues
of fact which courts would be altogether incompetent to decide, is plain. If the question were,
for example, as to the chemical reaction between a number of elements, it would be idle to give
power to a court to pass upon whether there was 'substantial' evidence to support the decision
of a board of qualified chemists. The court might undertake to review their finding so far as
they had decided what reagents had actually been present in the experiment, for that presumably would demand no specialized skill. But it would be obliged to stop there, for it would not
have the background which alone would enable it to decide questions of chemistry; and indeed
it could undertake to pass upon them only at the cost of abandoning the accumulated store of
experience upon the subject." Ibid. The court notes that labor relations has "been made the
occasion of wide study, and a very large literature has arisen, with which those only are familiar who have become adepts. Like any other group of phenomena, when isolated and intensively examined, these relations appear to fall into more or less uniform models or patterns
which put those well skilled in the subject at an advantage, which no bench of judges can hope
to rival." Ibid., at 887-88.
29

3SInternational Association of Machinists v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 72, 79 (1940).
39 This appears to have been the premise on which the court acted, for example, in NLRB
v. J. L. Brandeis & Sons, 145 F. 2d 556 (C.C.A. 8th, x944). Similarly, it has been suggested that
since the National Labor Relations Act "specifically provides protection to employees against
the consequence of incurring an employer's strong displeasure," such "unwarranted fears or
inferences" should presumably be ignored by the Board. Employer Freedom of Speech in
Labor Relations, 14 Fordham L. Rev. 59, 62-63 (1945). This argument, if carried to its logical
conclusion, would apply equally to outright threats of discharge for union activity, since the
employee should be presumed to know that such discrimination is proscribed by Section 8 (3) of
the Act. Yet such threats have universally been recognized as violative of the Act. Ibid., at
63-64. It is submitted that coercion must be judged by the effect of pressure techniques
without regard to whether an employee can be said to be "justified" in his fears, if the average
employee would so react. Courts have previously taken judicial cognizance of irrational fears.
"The question is, not whether the fear is founded in science, but whether it exists; not whether
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patterns influencing group behavior, such nalvet6 amply illustrates the wisdom
of trusting these complex problems primarily to specialists in industrial relations.4O
In this case there was evidence from which the Board could reasonably conclude that the compulsory audience interfered with the exercise of the employees' rights to self-organization guaranteed by the Act. Hence, a favorable review of the Board's findings would seem to be justified.41 Should the circuit
court of appeals so decide, the Board will have succeeded in protecting employees' freedom of choice from the dangers inherent in the employer's control of
working time and his dominant position in the plant. At the same time it will
have preserved to employers an adequate area within which they may exercise
their right to communicate to employees their opinions on labor problems and
policies.
Municipal Corporations-Tax Anticipation Warrants-Validity of Warrants
with Respect to Subsequent Reduction of Assessment-[IUinois].-The plaintiffs, holders of unpaid tax anticipation warrants issued by the West Chicago
it is imaginary, but whether it is real, in that it affects the movement and conduct of men.
Such fears are actual, and must be recognized by the courts as other emotions of the human
mind. That fear is real in the sense indicated, and is the most essentially human of all emotions, there can be no doubt." Everett v. Paschall, 6i Wash. 47, 51, II Pac. 879, 880 (x9io).
An even more fundamental error, however, is the tacit assumption of the learned author
that all the consequences of incurring "an employer's strong displeasure" are capable of legal
remedy. The Board has admitted its inability to proceed on charges involving objectively
trivial types of discrimination, Matter of A. S. Abell Co., 5 N.L.R.B. 644 (1938); yet it is submitted that what may be incognizable by a court, either because it is de minimis or intangible,
may be vitally important to an employee. Gardner, Human Relations in Industry 16-23
(1945); Whitehead, Leadership in a Free Society 11-2X (1936); Roethlisberger & Dickson,
Management and the Worker 361-64, 543-45 (x939).
40 The Supreme Court has recognized that "Perhaps the purport of these utterances may
be altered by imponderable subtleties at work, which it is not our function to appraise."
NLRB v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469,479 (1941). See Whyte (ed.), Industry
and Society -(946); Gardner, Human Relations in Industry (1945); Mayo, Social Problems
of an Industrial Civilization (194s). It should be noted that in the present state of the social
sciences no conclusive evidence could be presented to "prove?' propositions as complex as
those indicated herein. It is suggested, however, that work being done in these fields is sufficiently indicative of the conclusions advanced above to make reasonable such inferences by
the Board. To recognize the tenuous nature of the findings of the social sciences is not at all
to suggest that anyone unfamiliar with developments along these lines is equally competent to
deal with the problems arising within their general framework.
40 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has recently rejected the Board's finding that a
compulsory audience was coercive. NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., xg Lab. Rel. Rep.
Man. 2008 (C.C.A. 8th, 1946). Should the Second Circuit Court uphold the Board in the
instant case, a clear conflict between the circuits would be apparent. And in accordance with
tradition such conflict would presumably be resolved by the Supreme Court. Compare Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 142 F. 2d 193 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1944), with LeTourneau Co. of
Georgia v. NLRB, 143 F. 2d 67 (C.C.A. Sth, 1944). The Supreme Court granted certiorari
because of the conflict between these two cases. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 323

U.S. 688 (1944); NLRB v. LeTourneau Co.,

323

U.S. 698 (I944). The Board's position was

sustained in Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 3 24 U.S. 793 (1945), which reversed the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals and affirmed the Second Circuit Court of Appeals on the point of law
involved.

